Consciousness and conscious intent is probably like dark energy – impossible to physiologically define or detect other than thru it’s effects on other things — like behavior.
But isn’t this what we all seek in our professional work and application of advanced science? We have a very long way to go.
Here is the latest. Very obscure still. But we plug away. This does have implications for the application of brain research to practical uses, e.g., neuromarketing, brain training, etc. If the people who devote their lives to this don’t have any idea, what chance do start-up neuromarketing firms have?
This is a bit dense and we have taken the tough stuff out.
Psychiatric Times. Vol. 28 No. 1 Molecules of the Mind
The Neurobiology of Conscious Intent — By John J. Medina, PhD | Feb 9, 2011
Perhaps the seminal component of any clinician’s behavioral repertoire is the ability to understand the conscious motivations and intentions of their clients. This article addresses the work of conscious motivations at the neuroanatomical level.
I seldom address the notion of consciousness—let alone motivations—in this column for a very good reason. Nobody really knows what they are or even if there is a “they.”
…After all these years, researchers have yet to isolate an area of the brain solely devoted to the experience of consciousness. There may be none.
The findings described here originate from experiments that have attempted to determine how we voluntarily choose to perform a motor task (action planning). This work requires reviewing background information on association cortices and the neural substrates behind a decision to initiate voluntary action.
Functionally, the cortical regions of the brain and their myriad interlocking circuits can be divided into 3 modules. These consist of front-, back-, and middle-end domains.
• Front-End (Brain Stem) Functional Domains Are Sensory Information Processing Centers. The brain receives input from the eyes, ears, and other sensory systems. It sends the input off to various places for further processing.
• Back-End Functional Domains Involve Motor Control Systems. These systems essentially respond to whatever command the sensory cortices give to it (eg, execute a decision to move).
• The Middle-End Suite Involves Nearly Everything Other Than Front-End And Back-End Functional Domains. These association cortices generally entail higher processing features and are some of the least understood and the most mysterious parts of the brain.
One such cortex, located in the inferior posterior parietal cortex:
- is a sensorimotor association region that links sensory stimuli to motor movement
- It may even be involved in sensory prediction, which calculates the consequences of a given action through the simultaneous evaluation of input from both sensory (front-end) and motor (back-end) functional domains.
Volitional Motor Movement
Many of the actions humans initiate on a day-to-day basis seem to depend on a kind of internal free will. This sequence of events (also known as volitional motor movement) gives humans a sense of control: we act because we want to act.
That is why researchers use volitional motor movements in their research designs. Researchers interested in volitional behavior study neural prime movers behind decision making.
Exactly what does it mean to want to do something? We do not really know. The events that initiate movement occur in a fairly straightforward sequence (although it depends on the source of the signal). For example, a central processing area with directives for voluntary motor movements pass through a final staging area before the execution of an action. This region is the primary motor cortex.
Research on laboratory animals demonstrates that this cortex decides on a course of action that depends on the source of signals it receives before the execution of that action. One source originates in the premotor cortex. Signals in this area initiate movements in response to a specific external trigger, such as a visual cue.
The second source arises in the presupplementary motor area, which is stimulated when laboratory animals make the same movements mentioned above, but they do not originate from responses to an external source.
The movement instead arises spontaneously; a thought is internally generated through intentional actions. There is an observed rapid rise in electrical signals that build up just before the brain executes these actions. This has led to the notion that the presupplementary motor area harbors some kind of readiness potential, a useful function in generating movement.
In terms of human behavior, complex human brains have many more research issues to solve than standard laboratory animal research can address.
One potential confounder is conceptual. With research of this type, scientists often tell subjects to choose (or not to choose) from a variety of options. Is that voluntary? Hardly. This is like saying, “Okay, it’s time to have some voluntary volitional behavior now,” or like runners at a race who respond to the starting gun. Do volitional actions disappear in these experiments with human subjects? Are these subjects simply reacting to commands to respond, not to respond, or to respond however they want? To test volition, researchers should not control the input. Nevertheless the experimenter must, almost by definition.
Wilder Penfield Revisited
…When the inferior posterior parietal cortex was stimulated, the patient experienced an urge to move specific body parts. Stimulating one area caused patients to want to move their arms. Another region, the lips. Another region, the chest. This is similar to what one observes in frontal lobes, except that you are nowhere near the frontal lobes. Recall that this is the associative cortex region (a sensorimotor associative area at that), quite distinct from anything observed in the well-characterized general motor areas of the frontal lobes. Was this simply a remote stimulation?
This result showed that the answer would be no. The parietal cortex urges were qualitatively different from those obtained by stimulating parts of the presupplementary cortex. It is well known that if the presupplementary cortex is stimulated at a low current, the urge to act is acquired. However, if the same region is stimulated at high current, actual movement occurs. That’s not what happened in the parietal cortex. The urge was stimulated at low intensities, but movement was never generated at higher ones. Instead, subjects felt that they had already performed some movement.
This is important. The desire to move did not result from subtle motor contractions that may have been generated by motor regions (an alternative idea that has been put forth as a rational explanation for the results in previous experiments). Parietal stimulation never produces muscle activity, regardless of the intensity. The stimulation of the premotor cortex itself produces large-limb movements in subjects, but never the desire to move the limbs. They usually remain unaware that movement has occurred when these regions are stimulated.
These results suggest the presence of 2 specific aspects of conscious intention (however one defines it).
One might be the conscious correlation of preparatory motor commands in the presupplemental cortex region, as is clearly observed in laboratory studies of animalsThe other might involve sensory prediction of the consequences of those commands, under the domain of the association cortex region. A portion of conscious intent seems to be a specific class of experiences housed within the parietal lobe.
It appears that the parietal lobe contributes to the conscious experience of intention, at least in regard to motor movement. These results cement 1 more brick onto the great construction project that seeks to define intention. But they hardly hint at the overall building.
Pushing the edge of our understanding into the murky world of association cortex only means that future experiments will be trickier to interpret. Electrical stimulation mapping, as good as it is, is necessarily a blunt instrument that stimulates thousands of neurons simultaneously. Not isolated modules, these regions connect to each other in complex, little-understood ways. That the regions produce different behaviors is an important finding but not a defining one.
How do the frontal and motor aspects of volitional experience differ from the parietal, sensory versions? What factors stimulate the parietal lobes in the first place? What about remote effects?
Questions such as these remain to be answered and are just a few of the many that researchers will face as they attempt to define intentional and conscious experiences.